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Abstract Nonprofit organizations and philanthropists
stepped into a funding void caused by controversies over pub-
lic funding of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research.
Based on interviews of 83 representatives of 53 funders, we
examine the motivations and accountability structures of pub-
lic agencies, corporations, fundraising dependent nonprofit
organizations and philanthropic organizations that funded
hESC research in three jurisdictions: California, Sweden,
and South Korea. While non-traditional forms of funding are
essential in the early stages of research advancement, they are
unreliable for the long timeframes necessary to advance cell
therapies. Such funding sources may enter the field based on
high expectations, but may exit just as rapidly based on dis-
appointing rates of progress.
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Introduction
Controversies and debate over human embryonic stem cells
(hESC) gave rise to novel funding models to support research
on their therapeutic potential. A diversity of funders stepped
into the void left by restrictions in the European Union and
federal funding in the United States. Here we examine the
funder motivations and their accountabilities to understand
the complex funding environment in controversial research
fields. Which funders stepped into the void to support hESC
research, and why are some stepping out? To whom and how
are these funders accountable? To what extent were jurisdic-
tional differences in the blend of funding sources dependent
on the level of political opposition to embryonic research and
the cultural status of the embryo?
Opposition to hESC research stems from the moral status
of the embryo - hESC derivation typically requires the de-
struction of early human embryos. Some groups grant embry-
os full moral status as a human being, others grant embryos a
special status deserving of respect and protection based on
potential, while others denounce the commodification of em-
bryos as contrary to human dignity [1, 2]. Support for hESC
research arises from the moral imperative to develop promis-
ing therapies for unmet medical needs [3] and the potential for
economic development [4, 5]. Amidst continued controversy
over hESC research in the United States [6] and renewed calls
on the voters of California to support stem cell research and
the development of regenerative medicine [7], it is timely to
reflect on the motivations and dynamics of hESC funders over
the past two decades.
The international hESC research policy environment is a
patchwork of patchworks [8], which impacts funding priori-
ties and the research conducted [9]. The environment is highly
politicized - hESC research is one of few fields prohibited in
some jurisdictions, with other notable examples being human
germline modification [10] and human reproductive cloning
[11]. Legal regimes that govern hESC may be broadly char-
acterized as permissive - enabling the creation of embryos for
hESC research; intermediate - placing restrictions on the der-
ivation of embryos for hESC research; restrictive - prohibiting
hESC research or derivation by limiting it to imported hESC
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lines; and jurisdictions that have no specific legislation in
place (http://www.stemgen.org/stem-cell-world-map). HESC
research in federated countries like the United States may be
governed by an overlapping web of national and state laws,
resulting in a mosaic of permissions and restrictions.
Similarly, in the European Union a diverse legislative
environment characterizes its member states.
Despite the policy environment, hESC research has
progressed internationally. The International Stem Cell Reg-
istry lists 1304 hESC lines, of which 585 are available and 542
have data on provenance that enable researchers to determine
compliance with local laws (http://www.umassmed.edu/iscr/).
Publications on the lines vary from none to 743 (H9 (WA09)
from the University ofWisconsin), with a median of one; only
51 lines have more than ten associated publications, while 207
have none. This skewed distribution reflects international re-
strictions that limit research to specific cell lines. Contrary to
early expectations and this evidence of research intensity, clin-
ical applications have been slow to eventuate - few clinical
trials, primarily for forms of macular degeneration, are under-
way (Table 1) [12, 13].
Aside from political support or opposition to hESC re-
search in different jurisdictions, culture and institutional envi-
ronment additionally shape the organization of the research
[14]. Increasingly, research relies on a mixture of funding
sources [15] that are accountable in different ways to different
sets of stakeholders. Accountability pressures may influence
both the process for, and the substance of, funding decisions.
For hESC research, funding sources include national/state
public funding agencies; corporations; fundraising dependent
nonprofit organizations that are primarily disease focused; and
independently wealthy philanthropists. While the latter two
categories may overlap with respect to legal and tax structures,
we characterize philanthropists based on their freedom to do-
nate their independent wealth to the public sphere. Philanthro-
pists have actively shaped science policy, at least in the US,
since the early 20th Century [16–18]. In Europe, philanthro-
pists are increasingly active in the policy arena as state budgets
shrink and the private sector plays an increasing role in the
provision of public goods [19].
The concept of accountability is particularly important in
contestable scientific fields, where funder influence on re-
search and policy direction may result in these decision
makers being questioned about their funding decisions. Ac-
countability, or lack thereof, may influence the speed and ease
with which funders enter and exit funding arenas. Account-
ability is relational between the funder and its external stake-
holders. It may be upward to donors and governance boards,
or downward to grantees [20–22]. It also gives rise to an
obligation to explain and justify conduct; meaning external
stakeholders may question and pass judgment on decisions,
while funders may face the consequences of these decisions
[23]. Accountability is the means by which Bindividuals and
organizations are held externally to account for their actions
and as the means by which they take internal responsibility for
continuously shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission,
goals, and performance^ [24].
Differences in accountability arise between categories of
funders and between countries. Public funding agencies are
the most accountable because they exhibit all forms of
Table 1 Clinical trials of hESCs or cells derived from hESCs registered in clinicaltrials.gov
Sponsor and Locationa Disease Targeted Type of Cells derived from hESCs NCT Identifier Start Year Phase
Geron/Asterias Biotherapeutics:
CA, GA, IL






Dry age-related and Stargardt’s
macular dystrophy
Myopic Macular Degeneration








CHABiotech: South Korea Dry age-related macular
degeneration




Pfizer: United Kingdom Wet age-related macular
degeneration
retinal pigment epithelial cells
(PF-05206388)
NCT01691261 2012 I
Hôpitaux de Paris: France Heart failure cardiac-committed progenitor cells NCT02057900 2013 I





retinal pigment epithelial cells
(OpRegen)
NCT02286089 2014 I/II
aCA California, GA Georgia, IL Illinois
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accountability to the broadest set of stakeholders. Disease fo-
cused fundraising dependent nonprofits are, at a minimum,
accountable to their governance boards, patient communities
and donors [25]. Similarly, corporations are accountable to
their boards, shareholders and clientele. Philanthropists, on
the other hand, are not accountable to any specific funding
constituency [26] but are at a minimum legally accountable
[27].
Here we compare the motivations and accountability of
public funding agencies, corporations, fundraising dependent
nonprofits, and philanthropists in South Korea, Sweden, and
the United States with a focus on California. These societies
represent different regulatory and cultural environments.
These jurisdictions harbor researchers who are active in the
international hESC research community (Table 2), and their
public funding agencies are among the core 11 members of the
International Stem Cell Forum.
Background: hESC Research in the United States,
Sweden, and South Korea
HESC has been most controversial in the United States where
legal and political challengers have been at the forefront of
funding debates. In the United States, controversy over hESC
research dates to the seminal 1973 United States Supreme
Court decision on abortion rights, Roe v. Wade. During the
Reagan and Bush administration, funding was not available
for research involving human embryos, which culminated in
the 1995 Dickey-Wicker amendment that banned federal
funding of human embryonic research [28]. The second Bush
administration in 2001 went on to ban federal funding (pri-
marily National Institutes of Health (NIH)) that had been
allowed under the Clinton administration. The ban exempted
research on the few hESC lines that had then been created.
Some States, including California, stepped in with state
funding initiatives to support hESC research. The California
Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) was funded in
2004 from 3 Billion USD of State Bonds enabled through a
plebiscite – Proposition 71 [29]. Despite ongoing legal dis-
putes [30], the Obama administration lifted the Bush ban and
enabled federal funding for research on hESC lines created
after 2001. In contrast, hESC research has not been controver-
sial in Sweden [31] even though opposition and regulatory
restrictions exist at the level of the European Union [32, 33].
The liberal legislation regarding research on human embryos
may be related to the barely contended status of abortions in
Sweden, differing sharply from the US [34].
South Korea has had a unique trajectory of ethical contes-
tation following the Hwang scandal [35]. Dr. Hwang Woo-
Suk was a professor at the Seoul National University whose
2004 and 2005 Science publications on successful creation of
hESCs by somatic cell nuclear transfer made him a national
hero [36, 37]. Hwang later admitted ethical misconduct in
obtaining ova from female graduate students and the black
market [38] and his publications were found to report fraudu-
lent data. Hwang was charged with embezzlement and ethical
violations, was fired by Seoul National University, and his
funding support was canceled. Hwang was eventually sen-
tenced to a 2 year prison term for bioethics violations and
embezzlement [39]. Hwang’s fall from grace affected Korea’s
national psyche – the country had taken great pride in his
international scientific stardom and his subsequent disgrace
was reflected on the scientific community and its dreams of
progress and economic advancement [40, 41].
Methods
Our analysis is based on semi-structured interviews by N.W.
between October 2011 and June 2012 with 83 representatives
of 51 key funders in three jurisdictions: California, South Ko-
rea and Sweden (Table 3) and an additional 18 experts in
hESC research for background information. We identified
funders through internet searches, consultation with experts,
and from acknowledgements in hESC research articles
indexed in PubMed (Sweden October 2011, California Janu-
ary 2012, South Korea April 2012). The interviewees repre-
sented public funding agencies at state and national levels,
corporations, nonprofit organizations, and independently
wealthy philanthropists.
The interviews focused on the nature and structure of the
funder, its motivations for funding hESC research, and its type
and level of accountability to a variety of stakeholders. Using
Excel, N.W. (1) read transcripts of the interviews, (2) induc-
tively identified key themes, and (3) developed these into a
code book with codes that identified and explained each
theme. A trained Research Assistant then independently ap-
plied these codes. The coding was iterative, for example,
when the research assistant identified two additional codes,
N.W. re-analyzed the transcripts to incorporate these. This
form of iterative coding by two independent coders is
Table 2 Number of hESC lines and associated publications per
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consistent with best practices in qualitative analysis, known as
the constant comparison method [42, 43]. The inter-coder
agreement was 91 % on the motivations and 95 % on the
accountability data.
Results
Differences in Accountability of Funders of hESC
Research
In our sample, all funders interviewed exhibited legal account-
ability. They adhered to regulations on the ethical conduct of
research in general, and hESC research in particular. However
differences arose between public funders and philanthropists
as to the nature of their legal accountability. Public funders
continuously monitored regulatory adherence: Bwe have a
team that actually audits projects and goes to the universities
and companies on a regular basis to request information and
demonstration that they’re keeping to our policies and meet-
ing the standards we think that they should have and that
they’ve agreed to under their funding arrangements^ (Inter-
viewee 13, US Public Agency) and Bwe go out and do com-
pliance and education site visits and interactions with our
funded investigators^ (Interviewee 15, US Public Agency).
Philanthropists, on the other hand, left legal accountability in
the hands of their grantee institutions: BIt is entirely the
university’s responsibility^ (Interviewee 61, Swedish Philan-
thropist) – Bit’s up to the university to enforce the specific rules
and regulations^ (Interviewee 18, US Philanthropist).
Jurisdictional differences in accountability were also appar-
ent. Swedish public funders and fundraising dependent non-
profits were more transparent in providing their financial in-
formation online than in California and South Korea. Swedish
philanthropists also differed from those in other jurisdictions
by demonstrating professional accountability in the form of
membership in professional associations.
All categories of funders, except most philanthropists,
demonstrated fiduciary accountability to their grantees
through formal peer-review processes. Only Swedish philan-
thropists and one Californian philanthropist employed such a
process. In explaining the lack of such processes,
philanthropists emphasized their independence and tolerance
for high risk research: Bwhat we looked for is science or par-
adigm shifting research and in that sense this is difficult to do
when you have the scientific advisory committee that belongs
to different schools of thought^ (Interviewee 21, US
Philanthropist).
Motivations for Stepping into and out of the Funding Void
Motivations for funding hESC varied according to jurisdiction
and category of funder. Not surprisingly, corporations justified
their funding based on potential profits or clinical promise,
and public funders highlighted clinical promise and obliga-
tions to/directives from their political or bureaucratic masters.
Fundraising dependent nonprofits emphasized a broader range
of research goals, from basic research through clinical trans-
lation of therapies to benefit their constituent patient
community.
United States
In the US, all but corporations cited supplemental funding as a
justification for supporting hESC research. Restrictions on
National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding for hESC research
through the Bush Administration from 2001 to 2009 motivat-
ed disease focused fundraising dependent nonprofits to step
into the void. B[Because the Bush policy left a regulatory
vacuum for non-Federal sources of funds] if you had private
money you could do anything you wanted^ (Interviewee 19,
US Philanthropist). Other philanthropists supported hESC re-
search because they Bthought it was a very important cutting
edge type of research for medicine^ (Interviewee 18, US Phi-
lanthropist). Some fundraising dependent nonprofits were
specifically founded to support the research, including two
which ran independent laboratories with non-federal funds.
There was a Bsense of urgency to move forward (…) we were
the stop gap, we made sure that things made it through the
lean years and we’re primed and ready for huge advances^
(Interviewee 10, US Nonprofit).
Because the Bush funding ban left not only a resource
vacuum, but also a policy vacuum, philanthropists and non-
profits also supported the development of policies and
Table 3 Number of interviewees
per jurisdiction and category of
funder and number of funders
represented by those interviewees









Public Funding Agency 7 / 3 7 / 4 7 / 4
Corporation 6 / 4 10 / 5 3 / 2
Fundraising Dependent NonProfit 15 / 9 12 / 8 0 / 0
Philanthropist 6 / 5 9 / 6 1 / 1
Total 34 / 21 38 / 23 11 / 7
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guidelines Bif we didn’t do it, nobody was going to do it^
(Interviewee 19, US Philanthropist). US philanthropists stood
out from other funders in citing personal reasons, for example,
direct donations to the research program of a clinician who
successfully treated a family member. The motivations of phi-
lanthropists, therefore, highlighted their freedom and indepen-
dence in two ways. First, they remedied a gap in public policy,
and second, they donated based on personal relationships,
without application of scientific norms, such as peer-review.
Among the US funders, interviewees from fundraising de-
pendent nonprofits struggled to manage the expectations of
their donors and/or disease communities for hESC research.
In balancing their advocacy roles with their accountability to
these external stakeholders, nonprofits felt their role was to:
Bdiffuse the hype (…) to educate, not only by our funding, but
by the things that we talk about in public forums^ (Interviewee
12, US Nonprofit) because Bpatients sort of see it as the ulti-
mate cure, the ultimate treatment option^ (Interviewee 25, US
Nonprofit); Bso, we’re very, very conservative with reporting
progress^ (Interviewee 29, US Nonprofit). However, conser-
vative messaging was not well received because: BI don’t
know that people like to hear this sort of cautionary side about
ESC^ (Interviewee 12, US Nonprofit). As stated by the same
interviewee: BA lot of the stuff we see is either so basic and is
at such a remove from [the condition] that it should be more
appropriately funded by the [public funder] (…) or it is for [the
condition] but it’s just really lousy science. (…) the field had
gotten way ahead of itself, that there was too much myth and
hype, and still even today, there’s so much we don’t know
about [hESC] (Interviewee 12, USNonprofit). Others feel that
they funded initially to launch the field, but since the entry of
public funders, they have Bkind of scaled back^ (Interviewee
23, US Nonprofit). BFrankly, our money in an environment
like that wasn’t really making as big an impact as having state
money go to it. So we kind of backed off (…) Maybe SC will
never be the cure-all that we want it to be. (…) Who knows for
sure, but the real cure will come from some other kind of
treatment (Interviewee 25, US Nonprofit).
Sweden
Representatives of Swedish public funders were uncertain of
the extent to which they supported hESC research or why they
had funded it. These funders assessed hESC research along-
side other types of research without applying any special con-
siderations - they emphasized scientific progress and econom-
ic growth. These justifications were echoed by all types of
funders: BScientific quality is the only criterion of evaluation^
(Interviewee 61, Swedish Philanthropist). In Sweden, differ-
ences between public and private funders were less apparent,
and private funders similarly adhered to scientific norms for
accountability, such as peer-review.
However, sounding a cautionary note, Swedish fundraising
dependent non-profits also commented on the hype surround-
ing hESC research. While the field started with a lot of opti-
mism, it has become: Bmore realistic about the whole thing
and it takes longer, it is not as easy as you thought (…) and
maybe the focus has shifted from embryonic cells.^ (Inter-
viewee 56, Swedish Nonprofit). Indeed, Bnowadays maybe
embryonic, it’s a little bit out of fashion (…) it hasn’t been that
successful so far^ (Interviewee 59, Swedish Nonprofit).
South Korea
In South Korea, both private and public funders emphasized
the therapeutic potential of hESCs compared to other cell
types, global research leaders, the size and profile of the rare
diseases community, the Bstrong representation for IVF
[in vitro fertilization]^ (Interviewee 38, Korean Corporation)
and supportive policies for the derivation of novel hESC lines,
all of which contributed to prioritizing hESC research as a
field in which Korea could be globally competitive. Funders
indicated growing competition with China as a major driver
and the need to catch up to the same level of funding and
research as the US and UK. South Korean funders were the
most similar to each other in motivation and accountability
structures.
Korean funders also reflected on the damage of the Hwang
scandal: BDr. Hwang gave the public and overestimated blue
print to commercialization^ (Interviewee 41, Korean Public
Agency) and BWe had to deal with our reputation^ (Interview-
ee 38, Korean Corporation). Interviewees used terms such as
BTrauma^. The damage to public trust has longer-term impli-
cations, with the public Bbored^ and Bfed up^ with the issue:
Bbut still, our general public has some feeling against Stem
Cell discoveries and unfortunately that doubt extended to oth-
er basic research (…) so if some researchers say wow, this is
first in the world (…) they say oh is it really true or another
[Hwang scandal]^ (Interviewee 35, Korean Public Agency).^
Nevertheless, Korean funders also felt that the scandal had
served a public relations purpose with the Korean public and
motivated additional funding through a special presidential
drive in 2011/2012. BHis [Hwang’s] research output made a
big issue in Korea with like the stem cell researchers. So,
about stem cells, the Korean people, this made people to know
about stem cells. So, when people, they’re interested in stem
cell research also and there’s some issues makes like that,
budget for the research is bigger on some issues^ (Interviewee
42, Korean Public Agency).
Discussion
HESC research has attracted a range of funders, international-
ly. Their motivations and accountabilities varied in the three
12 Stem Cell Rev and Rep (2016) 12:8–14
jurisdictions examined here. Public funders, as the most ac-
countable, are tied to the policies of their political masters and
strict financial and fiduciary obligations to tax payers and
grantees. This manifests through formal processes of peer re-
view and financial reporting. While subject to external politi-
cal forces, these agencies are the least nimble in responding to
changing research environments. Corporations by contrast are
primarily driven by clinical promise and profit motives, and
therefore may rapidly enter and exit research fields.
In addition to public and corporate research funding, hESC
has also benefited from support from fundraising dependent
nonprofits, often disease focused, and philanthropists. While
fundraising dependent nonprofits were highly responsive to
their patient constituencies in funding the research and in
supporting enabling policy, our study shows that some are
currently re-examining their support for the field because,
contrary to patient and funder expectations for the potential
therapeutic benefits of hESCs [44], clinical trials have been
slow to materialize [12, 13]. No therapies have yet received
regulatory approval and may face hurdles in achieving market
acceptance both for ethical and for cost considerations; health
care systems and private payers are increasingly concerned
with the cost of novel therapies.
Because fundraising dependent nonprofits are socially ac-
countable to their donors and disease communities, they are
also highly responsive to research trends. Philanthropists are
even less accountable, and their funding is largely premised
on personal relationships and the interests of individual phi-
lanthropists. While these forms of funding are essential in the
early stages of research advancement, they are unreliable for
the long timeframes necessary to advance cell therapies. Such
funding sources may enter the field based on high expecta-
tions, but may exit just as rapidly based on disappointing rates
of progress. For the development of therapies premised on
understanding of complex biological systems, public funding
sources are the most stable, but may be equally unreliable
where that research is ethically controversial. HESC research,
especially in North America, advanced in funding and policy
only because of the participation of fundraising dependent
nonprofits and philanthropists. Retaining the trust of those
funders and the constituencies they represent is paramount.
Our study shows that locally contingent interpretations of
the research may influence the funding process and, in this
sense, circumvent or influence traditional accountabilities
built into the peer review system, altering motivations and
directions of large amounts of scientific funding.
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